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In Betweenness
In his assessment of French cineaste Jean-Luc Godard, Deleuze stresses the in be-
tweenness of Godard’s work, between sound and vision, between television and cinema, 
between image and text. This is Deleuze’s critique of postwar cinema as a ‘time image’, 
which offers the perspective of a disinterested, bodiless perceiver and which at its best 
presents the pure flow of time, becoming. Such in betweenness admittedly owes much to 
Bergson’s durée, and whose formulation of the image, which Deleuze essentially follows, 
is something between matter and memory, presence and absence, as much material as 
immanence, the material spiritualized; the spirit materialized, the image both and wholly 
neither. As Deleuze reminds us in his essay on Beckett’s teleplays, ‘The Exhausted’, the 
image is neither representation nor thing, but a process, a constant becoming, which, as 
it creates affect is the ultimate impact of art, not only in cinema, that is, but in other arts 
as well (Deleuze 1995: 19). Such process, an emphasis on flow and becoming, a perpetual 
in betweenness – between text and image, between past and present, between sensation 
and matter – suggests an incipient theory of theatre as well. Certainly such is the case 
in Beckett’s work, particularly his late work for theatre and media in which we find a 
preponderance of spectral figures, ghosts, absences, what Deleuze calls the ‘ghostly di-
mension’ (14). What appears on stage as a something, a material object, a body, perhaps, 
or body part, is not always fully present, something not quite wholly material, nor quite 
simply immaterial or ethereal either, something in between presence and absence, sound 
and image, or matter and image, between the real and surreal, Beckett himself an artist 
in between, neither wholly of his time nor wholly of ours, say, fully neither, even as he is 
always, if partly, both. The pacing May of Footfalls is a case in point: apparently a physical 
entity on stage, or at least we perceive an image in motion, she may not be there at all, 
or not fully there as the final short scene of the stage without her figure suggests. Spirit 
thus becomes light, perhaps a beam of light as the final image of the play suggests and as 
the assailing voice of Eh, Joe would have it. Beckett’s theatre is thus not about something, 
not a representation, the image or images of the artistic creation not images of something 
outside the work; they are ‘that something itself ’, as he famously quipped in 1929 in refer-
ence to James Joyce’s then-titled ‘Work in Progress’. ‘The identification of the immediate 
with the past experience, the recurrence of past action or reaction in the present, amounts 
to a participation between the ideal and the real, imagination and direct apprehension, 
symbol and substance’ (55).
In ‘Ohio Impromptu’ two figures seated at a table are ‘As alike in appearance as pos-
sible’ (1986,445), as the text reminds us. At very least they look to be materially equal 
entities, two physically present bodies. And yet the narrative or memoir read by the figure 
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functionally called Reader suggests otherwise, one a spiritual representative of an absent 
one, a former lover. If we assume some continuity, some congruence between the visual 
image and the narrated images, a self reflexivity to the performance, say, or an embodi-
ment of the narrative, that is, theatre as illustrative of a text, then one of the perceived fig-
ures on the stage, and perhaps the one apparently controlling the reading, the one called 
Listener, is a material presence, one an emissary, a shade, a spirit sent by the absent lover 
for something like consolation, ‘my shade will comfort you’, may not be. Our perception 
then may be faulty, the stage image ‘ill seen’ since at least one of the figures may not be 
there – at least not as a material presence. Something of a dream may be suggested here 
as indicated in the narrative in the third person, ‘in his dreams ... ‘, but reading the work 
as dream does not necessarily solve the issues of presence and absence, the material and 
the immaterial. Moreover, the narrative suggests something of the fluidity of being as 
the image of the Seine divided by the Isle of Swans is reunited on the far side of the Isle, 
and so finally, ‘grew to be as one’. Is this merging, this reunion, that of the lovers of the 
narrative, or of the two figures we believe we perceive on stage, one apparently material, 
one not, or the merger of dream and reality? But each of these possibilities is complicat-
ed, made problematic, say, as the narrative is both materialized and deterritorialized. We 
might add that a third active entity is present in performance, the text itself, at least some 
forty pages long, on stage, taking on a life, shaping our response to the performance and 
so to the central, thematic, philosophical issues. Text itself, we might say, our third player 
in the performance, is a link, a bridge, between the lovers, between Reader and Listen-
er, between the real and the unreal, or the real and the virtual, between materiality and 
imagination, or memory, thus linking past with present, giving spirit or shade a material 
form and simultaneously questioning materiality itself since both figures may be dream 
images, or versions of the same figure as ‘they grew to be as one’, at which point, ‘nothing 
is left to tell’. But such a phrase, the ‘nothing’ left ‘to tell’, is already written, already in the 
text at the telling, and thus a repetition. Text, as text, has presumably been thought and 
read before, and will doubtless be read again, the imaginative image or memory (and 
they amount to the same) that we as audience perceive will be repeated, with difference, 
over and over again, the ‘Impromptu’ not a telos, but a loop, a repetition, always with 
difference, and a bridge between the material and the immaterial, between presence and 
absence, the engagement not between figure and figure but between figure(s) and text, 
text already written.
Beckett’s move into television re-emphasized the imagistic nature of performance 
with bodiless narrators’ voices near or contrary to those images we see on the screen, 
the process offering further narrative dislocations. In Beckett’s 1985 television version 
of the play What Where , a disembodied narrator tells us, for instance, that ‘This is Bam 
(1999 409), Bam as character is thus already an object other than the narrating voice, 
who apparently is himself plural already, a multiplicity. ‘We are the last five’ (1986 470), 
he Voice continues, the grammar sliding from singular, Bam, to the multiple, a voice that 
is a ‘We’. At best, however, images of four characters appear, Bam, Bim, Bom and Bem, 
the mysterious fifth, apparently ‘Bum’ if we follow the vowel sequence, only incipient or 
already dispatched. ‘In the present as were we still’, the voice continues, the subjunctive 
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tense alerting us to the fact that this statement is contrary to fact. These are characters not 
there, the pattern of images coming and going, moving to and fro, to an off stage fraught 
with possibility, to receive ‘the works’, Beckett already anticipating such in betweenness 
in his Proust: ‘But he is not there because she does not know he is there. He is present at 
his own absence’ (15).
Such images with their narrative and visual disjunctions disrupt expected continuity 
and are part of or offer insight into the pure flow of time, what Deleuze calls the Plane 
of Immanence, perceptions always on the verge of becoming, that is, becoming other, 
something else, unsettling the received, that which we expect; they are thus a material 
bridge that generates affect, an emotional response not always specified or describable. 
The classical artist assumes an omnipotence and ‘raises himself artificially out of Time in 
order to give relief to his chronology and causality to his development’, as Beckett notes 
in his Proust treatise (62). On the other hand, great art, minoritarian art, Deleuze would 
say, is the pure expression of pure feeling, or as Beckett noted in Proust, a ‘non-logical 
statement of phenomena in the order and exactitude of their perception, before they have 
been distorted into intelligibility in order to be forced into a chain of cause and effect’ 
(66). Such a non-logical statement of phenomena is difficult to achieve through language, 
and Beckett recognized that fact: ‘At that level you break up words to diminish shame. 
Painting and music have so much better a chance’, he admitted to Lawrence Harvey (1970 
249). Billie Whitelaw describes her performance in Footfalls thus: ‘Sometimes I felt as if he 
were a sculptor and I a piece of clay [...]. Sometimes I felt as though I were modelling for 
a painter or working with a musician. The movements started to feel like dance’ (Whitel-
aw 1996: 144). Beckett’s language thus is always a foreign tongue, Hiberno-English in his 
native land; an outsider’s French in his adopted, language at times almost a non-language, 
sound, music, even pauses. Speaking of his direction of Fin de partie, Beckett’s French 
director Roger Blin noted:
he had ideas about the play that made it a little difficult to act. At first, he looked on 
his play as a kind of musical score. When a word occurred or was repeated, when Hamm 
called Clov, Clov should always come in the same way every time, like a musical phrase 
coming from the same instrument with the same volume. I thought that this idea was 
very much a product of the intellect and would result in an extraordinary rigor. He didn’t 
see any drama or suspense in Clov’s imminent departure. He would either leave or he 
wouldn’t. (Blin in Gontarski 2012: 172)
Beckett is thus, like Kafka, as Deleuze characterizes him, always a foreign and so a 
minoritarian writer.
Neural Theater
Such worlds as Beckett creates are thus virtual worlds that include past and pres-
ent, material figures, imagination, and memory; off stage or what appears to be empty 
space is thus a virtual whole, a nothing full of possibilities, including all possible actions 
and movements. In this regard Beckett’s theatre runs contrary to that described by Peter 
Brook in his famous theatrical treatise, The Empty Space; for Beckett the stage is never 
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empty but full of the potentially possible. For Deleuze, ‘Space enjoys potentialities as long 
as it makes the realization of events possible: it precedes realization, then, and potenti-
ality itself belongs to the possible. But wasn’t this equally the case for the image, which 
already proposed a specific means of exhausting the possible?’ (1995: 11). That is, space 
too is an image and so as material as it is ethereal. The fourth scene of Footfalls with its 
apparently empty stage remains full of interpretive possibilities, for instance, opens those 
possibilities even further. It is always replete, full of potential meanings and worlds, of all 
the possibilities that theatre has to offer since it includes the whole of the past as well as 
the full potential to create new worlds. The space then is always already full; in short, it 
contains the process of the virtual, part of what Deleuze will call the Plane of Immanence. 
Beckett’s plays then do not represent or realize a world of actuality, a world outside itself, 
do not represent at all, but offer images that make us feel in their affect the movement of 
existence, its flow, becoming, durée. Possibilities are not closed off by separating inside 
from outside, matter from spirit, present from past.
What too often frustrates readers or theatre-goers is precisely this resistance to rep-
resentation that characterizes Beckett’s art, since most of us operate on the Plane of Tran-
scendence that produces or alludes to an exterior to the artwork, the world we know and 
try to represent in art. This is the world of what Beckett calls the classical artist, a world 
from which he separated himself. For Deleuze the perceiving mind of a doubting Carte-
sian subject is a piece of ribbon that separates inside from outside. The ribbon itself or a 
piece of paper, or as Beckett dubs it in The Unnamable a membrane or a tympanum vi-
brating, is in between, neither inside nor out but both in relation to the other, the vibration 
evading the Plane of Transcendence or a grounding of any sort, ultimate truths, say, that 
we are driven to obey. The series of plateaus, perhaps 1,000, that Deleuze critiques in the 
book of that title, is an assault against such groundings, the stability of language included, 
as is Beckett’s art. Transcendence is a human disease that Deleuze calls ‘interpretosis’, or 
what the director of Catastrophe in the process of creating an image calls ‘This craze for 
explicitation. Every I dotted to death. Little gag. For God’s sake!’ ‘We’re not beginning 
to … to… mean something’, asks Hamm. ‘Mean something!’ responds Clov, ‘You and I 
mean something? Ah, that’s a good one’ (1986 108), and they share a communal laugh 
over the false promise of Transcendence, that they might be part of a greater system, or a 
greater truth beyond images of themselves in process. The alternative to transcendence is 
to accept, even to love, simply what is; Deleuze’s term like Foucault’s is also an ethics, but, 
after Nietzsche in The Gay Science, an ‘ethics of the amor fati’, the love of not exactly fate 
but of what is. One anecdote that Hamm tells has often been cited but less than satisfac-
torily discussed. The ‘madman’ that Hamm visits in the asylum is shown the beauty of the 
exterior, the corn, the herring fleet, from which the madman turns away appalled (CDW 
113–4). Hamm’s conclusion is that ‘He alone had been spared’. Critics may point out the 
likely reference here to the visionary poet William Blake, but what or how the ‘madman’ 
has been spared is seldom parsed. One possibility is that he has been spared preoccupa-
tion with a transcendent world, what Deleuze will call the illusion of transcendence, that 
will close and explain experience. Hamm’s ‘madman’ is thinking ‘other’, possible, alterna-
tive worlds. It may indeed be just those alternative worlds that Hamm keeps asking Clov 
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to find beyond the shelter, but they are within as well. In Act II of Waiting for Godot the 
issue is put thus: ‘[Aphoristic for once.] We all are born mad.1 Some remain so’ (CDW 75). 
Perhaps those are the saved, the parallel to the one thief on the cross. Hamm’s position 
is evidently to pull the madman back from the end of the world, a position that would 
resist or stop the flow of alternatives, becoming, durée. Later Hamm concludes the prayer 
scene with an overt statement about such transcendence, such ‘ethics of knowledge’. Of a 
transcendental reality, God, he says, ‘The bastard. He doesn’t exist’ (1986 119). Perhaps 
Hamm too has been spared, saved. As a seated figure Hamm is at a decided disadvantage, 
however. ‘It is the most horrible position in which to await death’, Deleuze tells us, ‘sitting 
without the force either to rise or to lie down, watching for the signal [coup] that will 
make us draw ourselves up one last time and lie down forever. Seated, you can’t recover, 
you can no longer stir even a memory’ (1995: 6).
In “Ohio Impromptu” two figures seated at a table are “As alike in appearance as 
possible,” as the text reminds us. At very least they look to be materially equal entities, 
two physically present bodies. And yet the narrative or memoire being read by the figure 
functionally called Reader, suggests otherwise, that one a spiritual representative of an 
absent one, a former lover. If we assume some continuity, some congruence between the 
visual image and the narrated images, a self reflexivity to the performance, say, or an em-
bodiment of the narrative, that is, theater as illustrative of a text, then one of the perceived 
figures on the stage, and perhaps the one apparently controlling the reading, the one 
called Listener, is a material presence, one as emissary, a shade, a spirit sent by the absent 
lover for something like consolation, “my shade will comfort you” as the narrative has it, 
may not be. Our perception as readers and audience then may be faulty since at least one 
of the figures may not be there—at least not as a material presence. But that is using the 
text to self-referentially read the performance. Furthermore, something of a dream may 
be suggested here as indicated in the narrative with its protagonist in the third person, 
“in his dreams . . . ,” but dream doesn’t not necessarily solve the issues of presence and ab-
sence, the material and the immaterial since even dream is imbued with a certain degree 
of material presence, with tactile, auditory and visual images. Moreover, the narrative 
suggest something of the fluidity of being as the image of the Seine divided by the Isle of 
Swans is reunited on the far side of the isle, and so finally its separated elements of seg-
ments, “grew to be as one.” Is this merging, this reunion, that of the lovers of the narrative, 
or of the two figures we believe we perceive on stage, one apparently material, one not, or 
the merger of dream and reality, an issue in much of Beckett’s late works, or the union of 
text and performance. Each of these possibilities of union, however, is complicated, made 
problematic, say. We might add that a third active entity is present in performance, the text 
itself, at least some forty pages long, as Reader reminds us, on stage, shaping our response 
to performance and so to the central thematic, philosophical epistemological, ontological 
issues. Text itself, we might say, our third player in the performance, is a link, a bridge, 
between the lovers, between Reader and Listener, between the real and the unreal, or the 
1 ‘All’ and ‘are’ are reversed in the American edition.
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real and the virtual, between materiality and imagination, or memory, between text and 
performance thus linking past with present, giving spirit or “shade” a material form and 
simultaneously questioning materiality itself since both may be dream figures or images, 
or versions of the same figure as “they grew to be as one,” at which point, “nothing is left 
to tell.” But such a phrase, the “nothing” left “to tell,” is already written as it is performed, 
already in the text at the telling, and thus already a repetition when we hear it first. Text, 
as text, has thus, presumably, been thought and read before, and will doubtless be read 
again, the imaginative image or memory (and they amount to the same) we as audience 
perceive will be repeated, with difference, over and over again, the “Impromptu” not a 
telos, but a loop, a repetition, a Mobius strip, but repetition always with a difference, and a 
bridge between the material and the immaterial, between presence and absence, between 
text and performance, the dramatic or performative engagement not between figure and 
figure but between figure(s) and text, text already written.
In his dramaticule of 1968 that Beckett designates as images of motion, Come and 
Go, we are denied access to information that would, if disclosed, shut down the process 
of thinking. Without that knowledge, the process of thinking, the generation of possi-
bilities, alternatives, parallels the flow of movement on stage. Language is not so much 
devalued among the 128 (or so) words in this playlet since much of it is elegant and po-
etic, language as part of (and not apart from) an image of flow. Or at the end of Beckett’s 
late masterwork, Rockaby, as the ‘recorded voice’ reveals another narrative thread, ‘and 
rocked / rocked / saying to herself / no / done with that [...]’, we might ask, ‘Done with 
what’ or ‘saying [what] to herself ’ (CDW 442)? What is resisted in such interruption is 
knowledge that would still such movement and freeze it, and end a process that Deleuze 
calls philosophy. When the American actress Jessica Tandy complained, first to director 
Alan Schneider and then, bypassing him, directly to Samuel Beckett, that Not I’s suggest-
ed running time of twenty-three minutes rendered the work unintelligible to audiences,2 
Beckett telegraphed back his now famous but oft misconstrued injunction, ‘I’m not undu-
ly concerned with intelligibility. I hope the piece may work on the nerves of the audience, 
not its intellect’ (Brater 1974 200). If we take Beckett at his word and don’t simply treat 
2 Of late, performances of Not I have taken on as much the character of athletic competitions as 
theatre events, actresses performing not only for a personal best but for a world record as well. 
In May 2013, forty years after the landmark 1973 Billie Whitelaw world premiere under Samuel 
Beckett’s direction, Not I returned to the Royal Court Theatre with a performance by anointed 
Billie Whitelaw successor, Lisa Dwan, who was ‘tutored in the role by Billie Whitelaw’, as the Royal 
Court’s press release and the post production video interview with Whitelaw (from 2009) inform 
us. Dwan’s iteration was first performed at BAC in 2005, at the Southbank Centre in 2009, and the 
inaugural International Festival of Beckett in Enniskillen in 2012. The running time for Dwan’s 
performance is an astonishing nine minutes, but still at a £20 ticket price, we might add, although 
on the night I saw the performance, 25 May, critic Michael Coveney proudly announced in the 
post production chat-up, the talk back to fill out the scant programme, that the nine-minute bar-
rier had been broken. The evening’s first question from the audience was whether or not Ms Dwan 
had a back story for the monologue. She admitted that she had as an aide-mémoire, but, mercifully, 
for the integrity of the performance, that is, she did not disclose it.
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this comment as a one off, as a dismissal of the actress or an admonition that she listen 
to her director, through whom, he told her, he would hence communicate, then he is 
suggesting a theoretical position, a theory of theatre. Evidence for the latter may be found 
in his attitude about Play, which similarly should be staged at incomprehensible speed, 
language become sound, music even, a pace which, admittedly, many a director, Alan 
Schneider among them, has resisted. Beckett’s instructions to Schneider were that ‘Play 
was to be played through twice without interruption and at a very fast pace, each time 
taking no longer than nine minutes’, that is, eighteen minutes overall. The producers of 
the New York premiere, Richard Barr, Clinton Wilder, and, of all people, Edward Albee, 
threatened to drop the play from the programme if Schneider heeded Beckett’s pacing. 
Schneider capitulated, and wrote to Beckett for permission to slow the pace and eliminate 
the da capo: ‘For the first and last time in my long relationship with Sam, I did something 
I despised myself for doing. I wrote to him, asking if we could try having his text spoken 
only once, more slowly. Instead of telling me to blast off, Sam offered us his reluctant per-
mission’ (Schneider 1986: 341).
What then are we to make of so neural a theatre, one that seems to put the emphasis 
on what Deleuze, writing after Beckett, will call ‘pure affect’? We can resist Beckett here, 
as Schneider’s producers and, finally, Schneider himself did, or take him at his word; that 
is, this is how theatre works, not by cresting simulacra, not by dealing with overall truths, 
but by demonstrating process and change, life as immanence, even as it is materially 
rooted. ‘Make sense who may’, as Beckett concluded his valedictory work for the theatre, 
What Where. In these shorter plays, then, Beckett’s most radical artistic vision, his most 
revolutionary theories of theatre, emerge. This brings us, moreover, to one of the most 
vexing and contentious questions in Beckett studies, the degree to which Beckett’s work 
is representational at all, or, on the contrary, whether its persistent preoccupation is with 
resisting representation, or rather to focus on how slippery and artificial representations 
are as they are played amid the Plane of Immanence, the perpetual flow of being. That 
is, Beckett’s art on stage or page is not a stand-in for another reality; it is that reality 
and more often than not ‘virtual’ in the Deleuzian sense of that term. Beckett’s theatre is 
always a theatre of becoming, of deterritorialization, a decomposition moving towards 
re-composition, itself decomposing. It is a theatre of perpetual movement or flow, all 
comings and goings, a pulse that creates affect. Even as it often appears stationary or 
static, even amid the Beckettian pauses, images move, flow, become other, not represent-
ing a world that we know, but perpetually creating new worlds. Bergson would call this 
durée, Deleuze ‘becoming’, Beckett simply art. It is a theatre struggling to resist the world 
we know, struggling to resist conceptualizing our world and the condition of being since 
those are mere snapshots and not the process, the flowing, becoming.
